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Abstract
Background: Private health expenditure in systems of national health insurance has raised concern in many
countries. The concern is mainly about the accessibility of care to the poor and the sick, and inequality in use and
in health. The concern thus refers specifically to the care financed privately rather than to private health expenditure as
defined in the national health accounts.
Objectives: To estimate the share of private finance in total use of services covered by the national package of
benefits. and to relate the private finance of use to the income and health of the users.
Methods: The Central Bureau of Statistics linked the 2009 Health Survey and the 2010 Incomes Survey. Twenty-four
thousand five hundred ninety-five individuals in 7175 households were included in the data. Lacking data on the
share of private finance in total cost of care delivered, we calculated instead the share of uses having any private
finance—beyond copayments—in total uses, in primary, secondary, paramedical and total care. The probability of any
private finance in each type of care is then related, using random effect logistic regression, to income and health state.
Results: Fifteen percent of all uses of care covered by the national package of benefits had any private finance. This
rate ranges from 10 % in primary care, 16 % in secondary care and 31 % in paramedical care. Twelve percent of all uses
of physicians’ services had any private finance, ranging from 10 % in family physicians to 20 % in pulmonologists,
psychiatrists, neurologists and urologists. Controlling for health state, richer individuals are more likely to have any private
finance in all types of care. Controlling for income, sick individuals (1+ chronic conditions) are 30 % in total care and
60 % in primary care more likely to have any private finance compared to healthy individuals (with no chronic
conditions).
Conclusions: The national accounts’ “private health spending” (39 % of total spending in 2010) is not of much use
regarding equity of and accessibility to medical care by the population. The mean share of uses financed privately in
2010, a more relevant measure, is 15 % with large variation between types of care and physicians. While, as under
national health insurance, richer persons contribute more into the finance of (private) medical care , and sicker persons
are more likely to use it, the solidarity principle—cross subsidization from the rich to the sick, which is a fundamental
principle of national health insurance systems, is clearly violated.
Background
The size and the role of private health expenditure in
systems of national (social) health insurance—such as in
Israel—have recently become a burning concern in many
countries [1, 3, 9]. In Israel, recently, a public committee
headed by the former Minister of Health (Mrs. German),
was nominated specifically to explore ways to strengthen
the public health system [11].
Private health expenditure includes, by definition, all
expenditures which are not financed by the (broad) gov-
ernment. In Israel, the share of private expenditure in
national health spending reached 39 % in 2012. This is
one of the highest rates in the OECD: the mean over the
34 OECD systems was 28 % (OECD, 2013). The above
concern, however, applies mostly to private expenditure
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done by the citizens. It does not relate to expenditures
made by private non-profit organizations and general
hospitals (such as Hadassah Medical Organization and
Hadassah Medical Centers) and private donations (both
constitute about 5 % of national health spending). Of the
(39–5 %=) 34 % of national health spending born by
the households, 8 % amount to premiums paid to
voluntary (supplemental) health insurance. While this
expenditure—as is the expenditure made by private
non-profit organizations and hospitals—is important
from national accounting and macroeconomic perspective,
its consideration in relation to the social issues mentioned
above is problematic, since these premiums reflect not only
expected (rather than actual) expenditure on medical care,
but also risk aversion.
A more meaningful—in relation to the social issues
raised above—measure of the households’ health expen-
ditures includes only direct payments on medicines,
medical materials and devices, and medical care, made
by the households or paid for by voluntary insurance. In
Israel, these include also dental care, mental health and
nursing care, most of it is presently not covered by the
national health insurance system (through the sickness
funds). In 2012, these expenditures constitute (34–8 %=)
26 % of national health expenditure.
The main public concern about the share of private
finance in total care expenditure, has been related to
inequality—the rich have higher access to private care,
and will consume more of it. National health insurance
systems are based on the principles of equality, fairness
and solidarity—where the rich subsidize the sick. These
principles imply a separation between (centralized)
income-related finance and (decentralized) health needs-
based delivery of service. In private health expenditure
made by the households (possibly partially covered by
voluntary insurance), by definition, this separation no
longer holds—health services are purchased directly and
individually—raising concerns about erosion in the three
principles mentioned above.
In this paper, we focus on the share of private spend-
ing in total spending on medical care. Ideally, we would
like to have a “finance-of-use” measure, namely, the
value of total households’ finance of services—financed
out of pocket or through insurance claims—in the total
value of services used—financed privately or publicly.
Interestingly, such a measure was introduced by the
OECD in 2012 for 23 countries (see the Discussion
section) but is not available for Israel. We focus instead
on the share of uses having private finance in all uses of
medical care.
We reiterate that we focus on health services which
are included in the national insurance package of bene-
fits. Thus, uses of dental, mental or nursing care are
excluded.
Beyond calculating the above measure for different
types of medical care, the analysis tries to identify the
effects of income and health on the likelihood of having
uses of medical care financed privately. Our interest lies
in testing two empirical principles. The first, equity in
finance, specifies that holding health status constant,
richer persons have a higher level of expenditures,
namely, finance of care. The second, vertical equity in
use, specifies that sicker persons use more services.
Methods
The data we used were taken from the Central Bureau
of Statistics, which linked information on households
from two surveys. The first (health) survey, which was
conducted in 2009, gathered general information regard-
ing the households and individuals and in addition
gathered individuals’ health information. The second
(incomes) survey, carried out in 2010, gathered both in-
dividual and household information regarding incomes.
Of the 8713 households (28,968 individuals) who
responded to the health survey, 7175 (24,595)—aver
80 %—were matched with information from the income
survey. The main reasons for non-match were non-
response and the dynamics of households’ formation:
some individuals changed households over the year—due
to marriage, separation etc.—and the match had no
comparative meaning. Naturally, the rate of non-match
is higher in the 20–40 age group.
As was mentioned above, ideally, we would like to
have the amounts of money spent out of pocket or
claimed from voluntary insurance for the purchase of
medical care and goods. The aggregate spending would
indicate how much Israelis spend privately on medical
care. The share of private expenditure on medical care
would be calculated as the aggregate private spending
divided by the total expenditure (received by the pro-
viders of care) on medical care, publicly and privately
financed. Such data is not available in Israel, let alone on
an individual basis. Instead, we focused on the share of
uses in which medical care (within the national package
of benefits) was not covered totally by the national
health insurance sources (through the sickness funds).
Copayments could not be identified in the data, and
were disregarded.
The medical care covered by the health survey in-
cluded (planned) surgeries, hospitalizations (during the
previous year), doctor visits (during the previous two
weeks) for each type of specialty and visits to physical
therapists, speech therapists, dieticians and occupational
therapists (during the previous two weeks). Note that
dental, mental and nursing care are excluded. For
each of these medical services we had information
whether each individual had used that service in the
recall period, and if so, how the service was paid for
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(for surgeries—how the planned surgery was to be
paid for). Although the respondents were not asked
specifically on the provision (purchase) of medical
goods, we cannot rule out the possibility that they con-
sidered them as part of the medical care use, in particular
as part of the paramedical care.
We recoded the source of payment for each use into a
binary indicator: public (sickness funds within the na-
tional health insurance) vs. all other sources, namely,
where any private finance is positive. Our measure of
the share of private finance is the share of uses of each
service, which were not solely financed by the sickness
funds within the national health insurance scheme.
In addition to calculating these shares by specialties,
we calculated them for all individuals who visited pri-
mary care doctors (family, internal, pediatricians and
gynecologists), secondary doctors (non-primary) and all
doctors. We similarly combined the paramedical en-
counters and all medical uses. Thus, a person can appear
more than once in the list of uses, and the different ap-
pearances can have either the same or different forms of
payment. The focal measure is, thus, the share of uses
with private finance in all uses.
We then related the probability of having uses fi-
nanced privately to the personal characteristics of the re-
spondents: income (family income per standardized
adult); health state (suffering of any of ten chronic con-
ditions requiring a permanent use of medicines); years
of schooling (0–8, 9–12, 13+); age (0–24, 25–64, 65+)
and gender, both in bivariate and multivariate analyzes.
In the multivariate analysis, since we focus on uses
rather than users, the observations (uses of the same user)
might not be independent. In order to account for this
structure, we used random-effect logistic regressions.
We note that the amount spent out of pocket on med-
ical care could be retrieved from the CBS’ Household
Expenditures Survey. This survey, however, does not
include information on health and on health services
utilization.
Results
The sample consists of 43 % aged 0–24, 47 %-25–64,
and 9 % over 65. Half of the respondents are women.
Seventy-nine percent have no chronic conditions.
Forty-nine percent have 13+ years of schooling, and
mean monthly net income is IS 4131.
Table 1 indicates that in 15 % of all uses of medical
care covered by the national package of services, individ-
uals financed the care privately (i.e., in 85 % of the uses,
the entire care was financed by the national health insur-
ance system). This rate varies somewhat among the
types of care studied. The lowest rate of private finance
is found in primary care (10 %), followed by inpatient
care (15 %) and secondary care (16 %). Uses of
paramedical care have the highest private finance—in
31 % of these uses some private finance was involved.
According to Table 2, the rate of privately financed
uses varies considerably along the specialty of the phys-
ician. We note that in several cases the number of uses
is rather small. The under-10 %-private finance group
includes pediatricians, oncologists and family physicians.
The 10–15 %-private finance group includes cardiolo-
gists, ophthalmologists, skin-sex, orthopedic and ENT
doctors. The 15–20 %-private finance group includes
internists, OB/GYN, surgeons, endocrinologists, gastro,
urologists and neurologists. The share of any-private
uses among psychiatrists, pulmonologists and “other”
(not appearing in the list above) doctors is above 20 %.
Table 1 Private finance of medical care
Medical service n of (valid) uses % (any) private
Primary carea 4167 10
Secondary careb 1639 16
Total physicians 5806 12
Paramedical carec 514 31
Hospitalizationd 1738 15
Total care 8058 15
aIncludes family, OB/GYN, pediatrics and internal physicians
bIncludes all other specialties
cIncludes physical therapy, speech clinicians, dieticians, occupational therapy
dIncluding surgeries
Table 2 Private finance of primary and secondary care by specialty















Family physician 3078 10
Oncologist 37 9
Pediatrics 775 7
Other doctor 129 28
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From Table 3 we learn that in occupational and speech
therapy uses, the rate of any-private finance is high—69
and 51 % respectively. In physical therapy the rate is 26
and 15 % of the visits to dieticians are associated with
any private finance.
Table 4 proves, in bivariate analyses, that richer indi-
viduals are more likely to finance privately medical care.
The rate of uses with any private finance in the top (5th)
quintile of households is double that in the poorest (1st)
quintile. In paramedical care, the rate in the top quintile
is 3 times the rate in the lowest quintile. A similar effect
is found with relation to level of education: individuals
with 13+ years of schooling are about 50 % more likely
to have any private finance in total, primary care and in-
patient care compared to individuals with up to 8 years
of schooling. The difference is almost 100 % in paramed-
ical care. In secondary care, the variation of the private
finance rate with respect to income and education is
insignificant.
The number of chronic conditions (0 vs. 1+) is mar-
ginally related in a bivariate analysis to the rate of any
private finance in hospitalizations and primary care.
However, advanced age is associated with a decreased
rate of any private finance, at least in secondary and
paramedical care. Women are more likely to have any
private finance in total care and primary care.
Table 5 presents the odds-ratios of the explanatory
variables mentioned above in multivariate random effect
logistic regressions by type of care. Income clearly has
remained a significant predictor of the probability to
have private finance. On average, an increase of 1000 IS
in net income per standardized adult increases the odds
of any private finance by 10–12 % in total and primary
care, by 16 % in secondary care, by 29 % in paramedical
care, and by 9 % in inpatient care. Clearly, private
finance of paramedical care is the most sensitive to the
level of income, and of inpatient care is the least.
In the multivariate analysis, health status has a signifi-
cant effect on the likelihood of having privately-financed
uses in total and primary care. Those with any (1+)
chronic conditions are 30 and 60 % more likely to have
any private finance than those with no chronic condi-
tions in total and primary care respectively. The private
finance of secondary, inpatient and paramedical care is
not related to chronic health, controlling for income.
The level of education exercises a significant effect
only in total care—those with 9+ years of education are
about 50 % more likely to have any private finance com-
pared to persons with less years of schooling.
Advanced age is related to less use of any private fi-
nance in all but primary and inpatient care. In total care,
persons aged 75+ are about 34 % less likely compared to
persons in age group 0–24 to have any private finance.
In secondary care the age gradient is clear—persons
aged 25–64 are 70 %, persons aged 65–74 are 78 %, and
persons aged 75+ are 84 % less likely to have any private
finance compared to persons aged 0–24. In paramedical
care those aged 25–64 are 88 % less likely than persons
aged 0–24 to have any private finance.
Finally, controlling for all other covariates, only in
primary care, women are 59 % more likely to have any
private finance. Having any private finance of inpatient
care in the Tel Aviv/Central district is 2.4–3.3 times
more likely than in the rest of the country.
Discussion
According to OECD definitions, 39 % of the Israeli na-
tional health spending was financed privately in 2012,
one of the highest rate in the OECD. The public concern
is about the deviation of the private finance from the
principle underlying the national health insurance
scheme enacted in 1995: from everyone according to
his/her ability (to pay), to everyone according to his/her
(health) needs. Such a separation can be achieved only
with public finance.
We found that 15 % of the uses of any care covered by
the national health insurance package of benefits (and
covered in the study) were financed privately. The
OECD provides international data, which is comparable,
in fact, to the “ideal” finance-of-use measure mentioned
earlier. From the Table “Individual health care services
and medical goods” by “financing agent” in OECD.Stat,
the share of private (non broad government) finance in
total cost of use of medical care can be calculated for 23
countries in 2012 (for 11 countries, including Israel, data
are missing). The average share is 26 % (the median is
25 %). The minimal share is found in the Netherlands
(13 %), the maximal—in the US (53 %). France has a
share of 21 %, Germany-23 %, and Denmark, Norway
and Sweden-15–18 %. Private finance is more prevalent
in the purchase of “medical goods”. Excluding these
goods, namely, focusing on individual health care ser-
vices only, the mean OECD share drops to 21 % (and
the median—to 18 %). The minimal share is found in
the Netherlands (10 %), the maximal—in the US (50 %).
France has a share of 15 %, Germany-21 %, and
Denmark, Norway and Sweden-11–13 %. We might con-
clude that the share of private finance in total cost of
care in Israel is below the OECD mean. Recall, however,
Table 3 Private finance of paramedical care
Medical service n of uses % (any) private
Occup. therapy 25 69
Speech clinics 62 51
Physical therapy 405 26
Dieticians 22 15
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that dental, nursing and mental health care—where
private finance is high in Israel—are not covered in this
study.
The rate we found is lower (10 %) in primary care,
about the same in secondary and inpatient care (15–
16 %), and higher (31 %) in paramedical care, in particu-
lar in occupational (69 %) and speech (51 %) therapies.
Twenty six percent of the uses of physical therapy, the
most prevalent of the paramedical services, involve some
private finance. The higher rate of private finance in
paramedical care originates from relatively low and
limited coverage by the public package of benefits.
Among physicians, family physicians and pediatricians
have the lowest rate of private finance (10 and 7 %
respectively). They provide the core of primary care.
Interestingly, in OB/GYN, the third component of
primary care, the rate of private finance is much higher–
18 %, indicating the choice of many women to go private
with this type of care. On the other hand, oncologists,
treating life-threatening situations, have relatively low
share of private finance (9 %). The specialties with the
highest share of private finance are psychiatrists (21 %),
pulmonologists (23 %) and “other” specialties not listed
(28 %). As with paramedical care, the higher rates are
related to limited coverage or availability of services.
Private finance of uses of surgeons (and probably of
orthopedics and urologists)-about 20 %—are related
to the choice of surgeon offered by supplementary
insurance. This rate is consistent with the rate of private
inpatient care (“sharap”) in Hadassah and Shearei-Tzedek
medical centers, where the provision of such care is
allowed.
Table 4 The population percentage spending on any private finance by selected characteristics (%)
Income quintiles 1 2 3 4 5 p
Total care 10 12 14 15 23 0.000
Hospitalization 10 15 14 16 25 0.000
Primary care 8 9 10 11 16 0.000
Secondary care 12 15 16 15 22 0.101
Paramedical care 15 24 30 34 45 0.000
Number of chronic conditions 0 1+ p
Total care 13 14 0.248
Hospitalization 17 14 0.099
Primary care 9 11 0.073
Secondary care 16 16 0.890
Paramedical care 30 32 0.664
Yrs. of schooling 0–8 9–12 13+ p
Total care 10 15 16 0.000
Hospitalization 9 17 17 0.003
Primary care 8 10 11 0.078
Secondary care 16 16 17 0.192
Paramedical care 20 23 38 0.004
Age 0–24 25–64 65–75 75+ p
Total care 15 15 13 13 0.098
Hospitalization 15 17 13 13 0.305
Primary care 9 11 9 11 0.327
Secondary care 22 15 15 14 0.029
Paramedical care 43 26 26 23 0.002
Gender Men Women p
Total care 15 16 0.000
Hospitalization 15 15 0.896
Primary care 9 11 0.047
Secondary care 18 15 0.091
Paramedical care 31 30 0.740
Engelchin-Nissan and Shmueli Israel Journal of Health Policy Research  (2015) 4:45 Page 5 of 8
Clearly, and as expected, controlling for health state,
income has a strong positive effect, consistent across all
types of care. The income effect is particularly large in
paramedical care. From the equity of finance viewpoint,
private finance is in accord with the principle which is at
the basis of the public finance under national health
insurance—rich persons pay (contribute) more than
poor people. This obviously violates the principle that
equally sick persons should enjoy equal care.
Controlling for income, sick persons are more likely to
have any private finance in primary and total care than
healthy persons are. Since in private medical care,
finance equals (the value of ) use (see below), we may
conclude that controlling for income, sick persons are
more likely to use total and primary private medical
care than healthy persons are. Thus, the vertical
equity principle—that sick persons receive no less
medical care than healthy persons do—holds in pri-
vate primary and total medical care. It does not hold
in secondary, inpatient and paramedical care.
Many argue that the high rate of private finance is a
result of a long and continuous effort of the Ministry of
Finance to limit the public health budget, with undesired
consequences for the equity of the system. Two health-
care systems—France and Australia—have intentionally
and explicitly done what the Israeli government has
Table 5 The determinants of any private finance of medical care use (random effects logit regression)
Any use Primary care Secondary care Paramedical care Hospitalization
Odds ratio [95 % conf.
interval]
Odds ratio [95 % conf.
interval]
Odds ratio [95 % conf.
interval]
Odds ratio [95 % conf.
interval]
Odds ratio [95 % conf.
interval]
Income 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.001 1.000 1.000 1.000
Sickness
0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1+ 1.299 1.053 1.604 1.592 1.079 2.350 1.773 0.872 3.605 2.296 0.768 6.864 0.777 0.543 1.114
Education
0–8 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
9–12 1.511 1.116 2.047 1.602 0.952 2.694 0.551 0.193 1.569 0.864 0.152 4.895 1.772 1.108 2.834
13+ 1.478 1.083 2.017 1.373 0.816 2.312 0.649 0.229 1.837 1.827 0.305 10.955 1.560 0.952 2.558
Region
Jerusalem 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
North 1.091 0.640 1.859 0.675 0.268 1.700 0.357 0.058 2.203 1.755 0.173 17.817 1.750 0.639 4.796
Haifa 1.448 0.904 2.319 1.476 0.663 3.286 0.492 0.109 2.222 4.203 0.454 38.937 2.355 0.923 6.013
Center 0.979 0.701 1.367 0.906 0.528 1.555 0.589 0.201 1.729 0.733 0.170 3.153 2.446 1.137 5.260
Tel aviv 1.104 0.778 1.567 1.013 0.573 1.792 0.430 0.136 1.358 0.894 0.203 3.925 3.331 1.540 7.207
South 0.999 0.639 1.563 0.992 0.476 2.068 0.295 0.066 1.319 1.583 0.233 10.740 2.094 0.841 5.212
Judea-Samaria 1.075 0.551 2.097 2.248 0.800 6.316 0.244 0.022 2.706 18.23 0.049 40.340 0.542 0.106 2.778
Peripheral status
Periphery 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Intermediate 1.035 0.714 1.502 0.735 0.378 1.428 1.112 0.287 4.303 1.090 0.188 6.307 1.591 0.894 2.832
Center 1.141 0.689 1.890 0.987 0.421 2.312 0.869 0.150 5.020 2.462 0.231 26.294 0.849 0.348 2.068
Age
0–24 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
25–64 0.856 0.682 1.074 1.042 0.712 1.523 0.296 0.129 0.678 0.122 0.020 0.751 1.086 0.724 1.630
65–74 0.712 0.501 1.013 0.817 0.453 1.474 0.223 0.066 0.755 0.089 0.008 1.035 1.089 0.608 1.951
75+ 0.662 0.459 0.956 0.843 0.460 1.545 0.158 0.043 0.583 0.080 0.006 1.041 0.919 0.503 1.681
Gender
Men 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Women 1.122 0.939 1.342 1.593 1.131 2.245 0.640 0.348 1.177 1.220 0.538 2.767 1.062 0.789 1.429
Constant 0.030 0.015 0.060 0.013 0.002 0.080 0.117 0.012 1.160 0.044 0.001 2.102 0.038 0.012 0.122
Pseudo R2 0.019 0.022 0.029 0.101 0.046
Bold = O.R is significantly different from1
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apparently done implicitly: they encouraged the use of
private insurance in order to shift the burden off the
public purse. In France, with a long tradition of concern
for equity, voluntary private insurance was introduced in
order to cover copayments, which have increased due to
freezing real public finance. Seventy nine percent of the
cost of care are financed publicly (social security, AMO)
[4, 8]. France is unique in that the voluntary insur-
ance (ACS) is complementary (rather than mainly
supplementary). This means that it covers essential ser-
vices such as hospitalization and visits to specialists. Con-
sequently, 90 % are covered, and a third of those without
coverage give up essential medical care. The French are
quite proud in the equity in access to care. This is
achieved, however, with strong safety nets. First, there is
a complete freedom of choice of provider and no ration-
ing of care. Second, the voluntary insurance premiums of
7 % of the (poor) population are paid by the public.
Third, patients suffering from a list of chronic conditions
are exempted, by their treating physician, from copay-
ments (ADL). Apart from clear inefficiency issues which
are related to the functioning of the unregulated health
insurance market, most researchers agree that the equity
of the system is unsustainable facing the ever increasing
healthcare costs. Increasing premiums raise the afford-
ability problem, where less and less citizens can afford
the voluntary insurance. This calls for either higher pub-
lic finance of the premiums for the poor and sick, and/or
the enactment of managed competition among the in-
surers, with risk equalization and transfers between in-
surers in order to keep the premiums affordable for the
sick. In either case, the move would be towards greater
involvement of the government, implying greater risk
and income solidarity.
The Australian story is quite different, but results in
similar conclusions. Introduced in 1984, the Australian
Medicare public system provides universal and afford-
able coverage for a basic package of health benefits. Be-
cause of the increasing medical care cost and the burden
on the public budget, the Australian government has en-
couraged private health insurance (PHI) ownership, and
since 1997, introduced tax exemptions to accelerate its
pick-up. Ownership rate reached 45 % in 2010, and it fi-
nanced about 10 % of the national health spending. As
in many other systems, PHI typically serves as a supple-
mentary insurance, offering some “extras” to those who
can afford it. In particular, it offers the choice of doctor
and shorter waiting times in public hospitals [7, 10]. The
equity of the system, including equity of access and
equity of outcomes, and in particular regarding inpatient
care, has been a major issue in the Australian health care
system in recent years [5, 6]. The most publicly debated
issue remains waiting time for elective surgeries in pub-
lic hospitals, when waiting times in private hospitals are
essentially zero [2, 6]. The threat is that increasing pre-
miums, with increasing medical care costs, will make
PHI unaffordable to many, mainly the poor and the sick.
The direction in which the Australian government is
heading is the enactment of managed competition
among the insurers, with ex-ante risk equalization and
transfers between insurers in order to keep the premiums
affordable for the sick. Again, we see an emerging move to-
wards greater involvement of the government, implying
greater (risk and income) solidarity.
The Public Committee for strengthening the Israeli
public health system (The German Committee) submit-
ted its recommendations in June 2014. It calls for stron-
ger regulation of the delivery of private care, and specific
changes in the voluntary health insurance market
(owned by about 80 % of the population). These changes
refer, first, to unbundling the supplementary insurance
policy, and the creation of a product covering choice of
surgeon and second opinion, which are the most com-
monly used services. Second, a standardization of the
terms of this product across insurers, both the HMOs
and the private insurers. Third, the premiums will be
community ratings according to age, and a risk-
equalization mechanism will be introduced. Fourth, the
insurance products will be subjected to regulation, and
more and clearer information will be available to the
consumers.
These recommendations seem to advocate the notion
that private care and insurance should be more regu-
lated in light of equity and efficiency principles, and they
are in line with those advanced in France and Australia,
namely, enhancing (risk) solidarity.
Conclusions
Focusing on the consumption of medical care, which is
the bottom line of a healthcare system, we estimate that
about 15 % of the uses of non-dental care are financed
privately. This is not to say in any way that the issue of
private finance in the Israeli national health insurance
system is less severe than implied by the OECD-national
accounts numbers (39 or 26 % of national health spend-
ing according to the definition of private spending).
Cross subsidization from the rich to the sick, which is a
fundamental principle of national health insurance sys-
tems, is naturally non-existent in private care. Conse-
quently, the main issue regarding the relatively low
public finance of health care in Israel is not only the low
level of public spending and hence the limited availabil-
ity of publicly financed medical services for the (sick and
poor) population. It is also the finance composition of
the spending, and the total lack of solidarity, which un-
dermines the principles of the national health insurance
system.
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Recent Israeli data indicates that national private
health expenditure has continued to grow after 2009, the
year to which the present analysis refers. This is mainly
due to increases in voluntary insurance premiums and
coverage. In order to identify the effect of these recent
increases on equity and inequality in medical care use,
newer data on “finance of use of medical care” is needed.
We may speculate, however, that the share of private fi-
nance of use of services covered by the national package
of benefits has continued to increase as well.
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